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ABSTRACT
Security is one of the major issue in wired and wireless network but due to the presence of centralized
administration not difficult to find out misbehavior in network other than in Mobile Ad hoc Network due to
the absence of centralized management and frequently changes in topology security is one of a major issue
in MANET. Only prevention methods for attack are not enough.  In this paper a new Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) algorithm has proposed against selfish node attack in MANET. Here the behavior of selfish
node is unnecessary flooding the information in network and block all types of packets transferring
between the reliable nodes. Proposed IDS Algorithm identifies the behavior of selfish node and also
blocked their misbehavior activities. In case of selfish node attack network performance is almost
negligible but after applying IDS on attack network performance is enhanced up to 92% and provides 0%
Infection rate from attack.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of mobile devices that can communicate with
each other without the use of a predefined infrastructure or centralized administration. In addition
to freedom of mobility, a MANET can be created quickly at a low cost, as it does not rely on
existing network infrastructure. Due to this suppleness, a MANET is very useful for applications
such as disaster relief, emergency operations, military service, maritime communications, vehicle
networks, business meetings, site networks, robot networks, and so on. In these networks, besides
acting as a host, each node also acts as a router and forwards packets to the correct node in the
network once a route is established nodes are able to transfer their information to other nodes. To
support this connectivity nodes use routing protocols such as Proactive routing protocols and
Reactive routing protocols. Proactive routing protocols such as Destination Sequence Distance
Vector (DSDV) protocol [1], nodes obtain routes by periodic exchange of topology information
in the foam of maintaining the routing table. Reactive routing protocols such as AODV (Ad hoc
On-Demand Distance Vector) [2] are ad hoc on demand routing protocols here nodes find out
routes if requires. In the route discovery process of AODV protocol, intermediate nodes are
responsible to connect a fresh path to the destination, sending discovery packets i.e RREQ (Route
request) packets to the neighbor nodes and the number of nodes that are in radio range of sender
will immediately respond to send back RREP (Route Reply) messages in network. If any the
number of nodes are that not reach to destination because of some limitations like node moves out
International Journal on Computational Sciences & Applications (IJCSA) Vol.3, No.3, June 2013
52
of range then in that case RERR (Route error) messages are generated. These error messages
confirm the possibilities of best route selection with minimum hop counts. In addition, AODV
enables intermediate nodes that have sufficiently fresh routes (with destination sequence number
equal or greater than the one in the RREQ) to generate and send an RREP to the source node.
Malicious node abuse this process and they instantly respond to the source node with fake
information as though they have a fresh enough path to the destination. Therefore source node
sends its data packets via this malicious node assuming it is a true path. Selfish node behavior
may also be due to damaged nodes dropping packets unintentionally. In any case, the end result
of the presence of a selfish node in the network is lost packets (both routing as well as data). In
our study, we simulated selfish node attacks in wireless ad hoc networks and evaluated their
effects on the network performance.
The paper organization is as follows: section 2 describes selfish node attack and related works
are described in section 3. Proposed Algorithm is described in section 4. Network simulation
results are presented in section 5 followed by conclusions in section 6.
2. SELFISH NODE ATTACK
Routing protocols are exposed to a variety of attacks. Selfish node attack is one such attack in
which a malicious node doing a routing misbehavior in the route discovery packets of the routing
protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to
intercept [3,4]. This attacks aims at modifying the routing protocol so that traffic flows through a
specific node controlled by the attackers. During the route discovery process, the source node
sends route discovery packets to the intermediate nodes to find fresh path to the intended
destination. Malicious nodes respond immediately to the source node as these nodes do not refer
the routing table and drop all the routing packets and also flooding the false information of
shortest route in network by that the number of nodes that are in radio range directly or indirectly
forwarded the routing as well as data packets in the network. The source node assumes that the
route discovery process is complete, ignores other route reply messages from other nodes and
selects the path through the malicious node to route the data packets. The malicious nodes do this
by assigning a high sequence number to the reply packet. In an ad-hoc network that uses the
AODV protocol, a Selfish node absorbs the network traffic and drops all packets. To explain the
Selfish Node we added a malicious node that exhibits Selfish behavior and capture the UDP
packet and block the TCP packet or can’t forward the TCP data to actual destination.
In a Selfish Node, after a while, the sending node understands that there is a link error because the
receiving node does not send TCP ACK packets. If it sends out new TCP data packets and
discovers a new route for the destination, the selfish node still manages to mislead the sending
node. If the sending node sends out UDP data packets the problem is not detected because the
UDP data connections do not wait for the ACK packets.
3. RELATED WORK
Standard Recently, a lot of research has focused on the cooperation issue in MANET. Several
related issues are briefly presented here.
Khairul Azmi et al [5] present a new mechanism to detect selfish node. Each node is expected to
contribute to the network on the continual basis within a time frame. Those which fail will
undergo a test for their suspicious behavior. This scheme is also a based on monitor node. A
monitoring node hears a request from its neighbouring node to forward a data packet; it will first
check the time difference between last request and last action and status of the requestor.
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Performance metrics are not measures in this paper now in present work we include the infection
ratio and performance metrics. Future work of [5] like acknowledgement detail and their loss are
also measure.
Al Shurman et al [6] have proposed two different solutions for black hole. The first solution
suggests unicasting a ping packet from source to destination through multiple routes and then
chooses a safe route based on the acknowledgement received. The second solution is based on
keeping track of sequence numbers. But these solutions have a longer delay and lower number of
verified routes.
Misbehavior detection and reaction are described in [7], by Marti, Giuli, Lai and Baker. The
paper presents two extensions to the DSR algorithm: the watchdog and the path rater. The
watchdog identifies misbehaving nodes by listening promiscuously to the next node transmission
but not detect misbehavior in presence of ambiguous collisions, receiver collisions, limited
transmission power, false misbehavior and partial dropping.
This technique is imperfect due to collisions, limited transmit power and partial dropping.
Buchegger and Le Boudec [8] present the CONFIDANT protocol. Each node monitor the
behaviour of its next hop neighbors in a similar manner to watchdog. Deciding the criteria for
maintaining the friends list by Trust Manager is difficult.
CORE (Collaborative Reputation) [9] is a reputation based system proposed by Michiardi et al
similar to CONFIDANT. The limitation with CORE is that the most reputed nodes may become
congested as most of the routes are likely to pass through them. Also the limitations of the
monitoring system in networks with limited transmission power and directional antennas have not
been addressed in CORE.
Patcha et al [10] have proposed a collaborative architecture for black hole prevention as an
extension to the watchdog method.
Bansal et al [11] have proposed a protocol called OCEAN (Observation-based Cooperation
Enforcement in Ad hoc Networks), which is the enhanced version of DSR protocol. OCEAN uses
a monitoring system and a reputation system to identify malicious nodes. But OCEAN fails to
deal with misbehaving nodes properly. These papers have addressed the black hole attack
problem on unicast routing protocols.
Balakrishnan [12] has proposed a TWOACK scheme which can be implemented as an add-on to
any source routing protocol. Instead of detecting particular misbehaving node, TWOACK scheme
detects misbehaving link and then seeks to alleviate the problem of routing misbehavior by
notifying the routing protocol to avoid them in future routes. It is done by sending back a
TWOACK packet on successful reception of every data packet, which is assigned a fixed route of
two hops in the direction opposite to that of data packets. Basic drawback of this scheme includes
it cannot distinguish exactly which particular node is misbehaving node. Sometime well behaving
nodes became part of misbehaving link and therefore cannot be further used the network. Thus a
lot of well behaved node may be avoided by network which results in losing of well behaved
routes.
Vijaya [13] proposed another acknowledgement based scheme similar to TWOACK scheme This
scheme detects the misbehaving link, eliminate it and choose the other path for transmitting the
data. The main idea is to send 2ACK packet which is assigned a fixed route of two hops back in
the opposite direction of the data traffic route and to reduce the additional routing overhead, a
fraction of the data packets will be acknowledged via a 2ACK packet. This scheme also consists
of multicasting method by which sender can broadcast information of misbehaving nodes so that
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other nodes can avoid path containing misbehaving nodes and take another path for the data
transmission. Although routing overhead caused by transmission of acknowledgement packets is
minimized but this scheme also suffers to detect the particular misbehaving node.
Usha and Radha [14] proposed Ack is better than TWOACK scheme, in which each  send  a
normal Ack to its immediate source node after receipt of any kind of packet. This scheme
requires an end to end Ack packet (i.e. Nack) to be sent between the source and the destination.
Possible drawback includes lot of routing overhead because of Ack and Nack packets. Also due
to nodes mobility probability of Nack packet reaching to source becomes smaller with the large
number of intermediate nodes between source and destination.
Zeshan [15] proposed a two-fold approach for detection and isolation of nodes that drops data
packets. First approach attempts to detect the misbehavior of nodes and will identify the
malicious activity in network. It is done by sending an ACK packet by each intermediate node to
its source node for confirming the successful reception of data packets. Other approach identifies
exactly which intermediate node is doing malicious activity. It is done by monitoring the
intermediate nodes of active route by the nodes near to active path which lies in their transmission
range and by the nodes which are on the active route. When number of dropped packets by a
particular node exceeds certain threshold, the monitoring node in that range declares that node as
misbehaving node and broadcast this information in the network by that all the normal nodes are
aware about the attacker. Main disadvantage of this scheme includes the overhead due to
transmissions of acknowledgement packets by every intermediate node to the source and working
of all nodes in promiscuous mode.
4. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
4.1. Algorithm for Selfish Node Creation and prevention
Set mobile node = M           //Total Mobile Nodes
Set source node = S                //S Є M
Set Destination Node = D      // D Є  M
Set Routing Protocol =AODV
Start simulation time = t0
Set radio range = rr;     //initialize radio range
RREQ_B(S, D, rr ) // broadcast for communication and send request packet to D node
{
If ((rr<=250) && (next hop >0))
{
Compute route ()
{
rtable->insert(rtable->rt_nexthop); //nexthop to RREQ source
if (dest==true)
{ send ack to source node with rtable;
Data_packet_send(s_no, nexthop, type)
}
else {
destination not found;
}
}
}
else { destination un-reachable ;
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}
}
Selfish_Node ()    //Selfish Node Work
{
Check (incoming packet)
{ If (pkt == ‘Routing’)
{Capture and updated destination field ;
Send route ACK to sender;
}
Else if (pkt == ‘TCP’)
{Block TCP packet }
Else If {pkt ==’UDP’}
{Capture UDP packet;
Can’t Send to Destination;
}
Else ( pkt ==’other’)
{Drop; }
Set (false_pkt= (scan_rate * pkts_max_) / selfish node);  // false packet send’s to all normal
node
Selfish_Broadcast (inf_pkt, nexthop)
{
Set priority = 1 // Higher priority
Send false_pkt = 100 pkts/ms // greater than the limit
Find (number of pkt accepted node)
}
4.2. IDS for Elimination of Selfishness Algorithm
Set IDS node = p ; // IDS node
Set routing =AODV ;
RREQ_B(p, n, rr) // broadcast for communication and send request packet to all n nodes
via p node
{
If ((rr<=250) && (next hop >0))
{
Set false_pks_rm (removal) = ( scan_rate *pkt s_max_ / selfish node);  // false packet disable
module
If (false_rm  => 100)
{ Selfish Node Block ; }
Check_Selfishness (S,D,M)
{
If ((node € M) && (pkt < 100 pkts/ms)
{
pkt accepted by neighbor;
pkt_Accept_limit();
}
Else { Node_Selfish()
{ can’t accept by neighbor ;
Block pkts sender ;
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}}}
If  (any node belong is in radio range && receives that request packet && heavy load node)
{ Node l = week node // l є n
Check load of  Node l ;
If (load > normal  load)
{   false_pkts_rm = 1;
{ Node infection remove via false_pkts_rm  parameter ;
}}
}
Node unreachable;
}
Node out of range;
}
4.3. Algorithm Description.
Behavior of selfish node is to be defined in first point of this section this attack drops all the
packets in the network routing, TCP and UDP. The selfish node behavior are also explained in the
foam of generating false packets in the network.  The scan rate is calculated with maximum
number of packets suppose number of nodes  having  capability of packets handling are 10 and
scan rate is that capability of  nodes in terms of time means in seconds or microseconds then
suppose this is 1000 pktsps  now divide the  number of value of false packets  by number of
selfish node in the network. The value comes after calculation is the number of false packets in
actual generate by each selfish node in the network.
An intrusion-detection system (IDS) can be defined as the tools, methods, and resources to help
identify, assess, and report unauthorized or unapproved network activity. Intrusion detection is
typically one part of an overall protection system that is installed around a system or device—it is
not a stand-alone protection measure. In our simulation module we apply IDS module that protect
through the selfish node behavior if Selfish node in the range of IDS. Very first IDS check which
node update the routing table and send higher sequence number to the sender node, if find out so
IDS sends the message to the sender node for elimination of that particular path where belongs
selfish node and search new route according to IDS instruction. Here IDS internal module
provides only protection of misbehave and provide trust communication between sender and
destination. After prevention we detect selfish node via trace analysis and provide secure
communication in MANET.
In our approach we have inbuilt IDS module with AODV routing and Selfish behavior module.
Very first we attach IDS and Selfish module in the NS-2 package and update the make file
through following command:
selfish/selfish_logs.o selfish/selfish.o selfish/selfish_rtable.o
selfish/selfish_rqueue.o\idsaodv/idsaodv_logs.oidsaodv/idsaodv_rtable.o
idsaodv/idsaodv_rqueue.o idsaodv/idsaodv.o
After that we update the packet.h file through PT_idsAODV= "IDSAODV"; and PT_selfish=
"Selfish"; and compile the internal module if new object file generated then we create TCL (tool
command language script) for the scenario creation and create the MANET scenario, TCL invoke
the new module Selfish and IDS module and gives the behavior according to selfish and IDS
module. Then we create two different type of Output file name as .tr (trace file) and .nam
(network animator file) through TCL script. Trace file contain each information in particular
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discrete event of simulation and that file passes to awk (abstract window tool kit) and get the
output in the form of routing overhead, throughput, average end-to-end delay etc.
Here we create three module names as AODV simple routing, IDS (intrusion detection and
prevention system) module and selfish module step by step
5. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
The detailed simulation model is based on network simulator-2 (ver-2.31) [16], is used in the
evaluation. The NS instructions can be used to define the topology structure of the network and
the motion mode of the nodes, to configure the service source and the receiver to create the
statistical data trace file and so on. Performance metrics are calculated from trace file (.tr), that
has contained the all simulation information.
5.1. Simulation Parameters for Case Study.
In our scenario we take 30 nodes in which nodes 1-27 are simple nodes, and node 29 is a
malicious nodes or Selfish node and node 28 is an IDS node. The simulation is done using ns-2,
to analyze the performance of the network by varying the nodes mobility. The evaluated
performances are given below. We are taking the following parameters for case study shown in
table 1. Note down selfish nodes are consider one in case of attack to visualized the effect of
attack but  after applying  IDS scheme consider the selfish nodes are two (29 and 14) to see the
secure effect of  IDS  in network.
Table 1.  Simulation Parameters for Case Study.
Number of nodes 30
Selfish node 1 or 2
IDS Node 1
Dimension of simulated area 800×600
Routing Protocol AODV
Simulation time (seconds) 100
Transmission Range 250m
Traffic type CBR
Packet size (bytes) 512
Number of traffic connections (TCP or UDP) 20
Maximum Speed (m/s) 30
5.2. The Performance Metrics
In this paper we focus on evaluating the protocols under Selfish node or malicious nodes
attack and measure the network performance after applying intrusion detection system with
following criteria [2, 3, 8, 9, and 13].
1. Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF): The ratio of data the   delivered to the destination to
the data send out by source.
2. Throughput: Numbers of packets send or received in per unit of time.
3. Normalized routing overhead: This is the ratio of routing-related transmissions (RREQ,
RREP, RERR etc) to data transmissions in a simulation. .
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4. End to End Delay: The difference in the time it takes for a sent packet and to reach the
destination.
5.3. Results
In this section we present a set of simulation experiments to evaluate this protocol by
comparing with the original AODV [5]
5.3.1. PDF Analysis in case of Attack and IDS
In this graph we observe that in case of attack only at time about 5 sec the PDF value is 65 but
after that the PDF percentage continuously decreases and reach up to 15 %. But after applying
IDS The PDF continuously increases w.r.t to time  it means that  IDS node will block the
misbehavior activity of selfish node  and also providing the shortest and secure path to nodes by
that they the PDF is about 92% in presence of IDS. This one is the important parameter to
measure the network performance in network layer because if the number of packets is
successfully delivered in the network then definitely the packet loss is minimum. By applying
IDS we recover about 75% data delivery in network; this one is huge loss in attack case.
Figure1. PDF analysis in case of attack and IDS
5.3.2. Normalized Routing Overhead Analysis
This graph has show the routing load analysis in case of attack and IDS. Here we clearly observe
the effect of attack in network. In case of attack only about 1000 packets are delivered because
remaining packets are drop by selfish node then in case of attack NRL is minimum. But after
applying IDS a normal secure routing packets delivered in network and also deliver successfully
data between the nodes. Now in case of a IDS about 6000 routing packets are delivered, this is
about 6 times higher than attack.
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Figure 2.  NRL analysis in case of attack and IDS
5.3.3. Throughput Analysis
Throughput analysis in in case of attack clearly show that the throughput in case of attack is
negligible but after applying IDS number of packets send in network  are continuously increases
by that throughput are increases.  Here we see that at the time about 22 seconds throughput is
negligible in case of attack and IDS but after that in IDS case throughput increases up to 42
packets are send in per unit of time. Now in IDS case throughput is about 100% as compare to
attack. The throughput value in graph is not visualized because it is less than 1.
Figure 3. Throughput analysis in case of attack and IDS
5.3.4. Infection Percentage
Infection percentage represents the infection percentage w.r.t time. Infection percetage in case of
attack are continuously increases reach up to 42%. At time about after 4 sec. the infection are in
maximum percentage value but at the time of IDS the infection percentage is zero and not a
International Journal on Computational Sciences & Applications (IJCSA) Vol.3, No.3, June 2013
60
single packet is affected by selfish node attack.IDS will block the whole activity of selfish node
and remove the infection from network.
Figure 4.  Infection Percentage in case of attack and IDS
Table 2 represents the effect of attack in TCP packets. Here the node 29 are drop the highest
number of packets and remaining nodes are not deliver actual number of packets in network
because most of the route request packets dropped by selfish node.
Table 2. TCP Packet Analysis in Case of Attack
Sender
Node
Packets
Sends
Receiver
Node
Packets
Receives
Packets Drop
by Node
Drop
Packets
0 19 7 8 29 67
2 27 11 6
5 7 19 3
6 6 21 1
22 20 24 1
25 7 -
Packets send
= 86
Packets
receive = 19
TCP acknowledgement (Ack) details are given in table 3. Here it is clear that a negligible number
of Ack are received by sender nodes. Now attacker drops about all the Ack packets and Ack drop
by node field is nil it means that Ack are lost by attacker. There is no information in network
which nodes are drop the Ack packets.
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Table 3. TCP Acknowledgement Packet Analysis  in Case of Attack
Ack  receiver Node Ack  packets
receives
Ack drop by
Node
Ack Drop
0 3 - -
2 6
5 1
22 8
25 1
Total Ack. receives 19
IDS scheme really show the actual performance of network which is shown in table 4.This table
clearly show  how many data packets are transfer, receive and drop in between sender,  receiver
and intermediate nodes.
Table 4. TCP Packet Analysis in Case of IDS
Sender
Node
Packets
Sends
Receiver
Node
Packets
Receives
Packets
Drop by
Node
Drop
Packets
0 729 7 1415 0 9
2 414 11 401 1 10
5 161 19 306 2 9
6 310 21 695 5 3
22 1458 24 28 6 10
25 42 28 147 8 4
10 10
13 1
14 2
17 2
22 37
23 3
25 18
26 1
Packets
send = 3114
Packets
receive =
2992
Packet
Drop
119
The table 5 is showing the actual information about the Ack. packets send by receiver and
intermediate nodes in network. As compare to attack case here the almost all Ack. packets are
receive. In both Ack. tables there is no information about attacker node because their behaviors
are not normal as other node.
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Table 5. TCP Acknowledgement Packet Analysis in Case of IDS
Ack Node Ack Packets
Receives
Ack drop by Node Ack Drop
0 653 0 9
2 352 1 8
5 124 2 1
6 289 7 23
22 1385 8 2
25 19 11 36
12 11
17 6
19 33
20 9
23 5
24 12
25 2
26 1
28 9
Total ACK
Receives
2822 ACK. Drop 167
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Finally after visualize the results, it can be concluded that the Selfish node effect on performance
metrics. Effect on packet loss is clearly visualized in PDF and throughput. As malicious node is
the main security threat that effect the performance of the AODV routing protocol. Its detection is
the main matter of concern.  The acknowledgement(ACK) of TCP represents that due to fake
information in network  most of the  senders are not obtain the ACK from receiver  means all the
ACK are lost and after applying IDS scheme every node that take part in routing will show the
information of ACK packets.
Therefore the proposed IDS scheme work will be excellent to detect and defense the network
from Selfish node attack. In Future we also detect the effect of selfish attack in performance
matrices and also Selfish node for AODV can be implemented in real life scenario and its
analysis can be compared with the analysis results.
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